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PAY OR DON'T PLAY: BACKGROUND MUSIC
AND THE SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPTION OF
COPYRIGHT LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Walk into any coffee shop or neighborhood eatery, and you will most
likely hear music in the background. The tunes may be soft and almost
inaudible, or they may be overwhelming, turning conversations with your
dining companions into a near shouting match. Regardless of the type of
music or its noise level, music is becoming a staple in public establish-
ments. Proprietors use music in their establishments for several purposes.'
They may intend for the music to relax the patrons, to enhance the
atmosphere, or to promote a theme.2 Most people, however, do not realize
that in order to play copyrighted music in an establishment, they must first
obtain permission from the copyright holder. Regardless if the music
comes from a compact disc or from a radio broadcast, a music license is
necessary to avoid violating the copyright laws.
There are many reasons why a proprietor fails to obtain a music
license. A possible reason may be the music purveyor's perception that
such music licenses are not justified. When one merely tunes into a radio
broadcast at home, common sense supports the belief that licenses are
unnecessary. Both the patrons and management of the establishment may
listen to the radio broadcast in their homes or car without special
permission from the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers ("ASCAP") or Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI");3 however, once
I. Establishments which play background music vary endlessly. See, e.g.. BMI v. Claire's
Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991) (retail chain stores); Springsteen v. Plaza Roller
Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (miniature golf course).
2. Sound Affects: Mommy, Where Does Muzak Come From?, Oct. 3, 1994, at 2-3 (Muzak
promotional literature) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal)
[hereinafter Sound Affects]; Jeanne McDermott, If It's to Be Heard But Not Listened to, It Must
Be Muzak, SMITHSONIAN, Jan. 1990, at 74-80; Andrea Dorfman, How Muzak Manipulates You,
Sci. DIG., May 1984, at 26.
3. ASCAP, formed in 1914, was created to collectively enforce the performance rights of
song writers and publishers. BMI was formed by various radio broadcasters in 1939. These two
organizations are the largest of the performance rights groups. There are also other small,
privately owned performing rights societies, the most important being the Society of European
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the same parties enter a restaurant or a bar and listen to the same broadcast,
it seems unimaginable that a license is required. This is because turning
on a radio is considered a "performance" of the songs which come over the
airwaves, which must be authorized.
A second possible reason for a music purveyor's failure to obtain a
license is that the purveyor was unaware of the licensing requirements.
And even when they are aware of licensing requirements, a third reason
music purveyors may fail to obtain a license is that they believe their use
of the music falls under an exemption to the copyright laws. Congress has
provided several exemptions which allow unlicensed performances of
copyrighted works.4 Those exemptions may be found in § 110 of the
Copyright Act.5 Specifically, § 110(5) provides an exemption to certain
businesses, but misunderstanding of the exemption leads establishment
owners to the mistaken conclusion that they do not need a music license.
In Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enterprises,6 the defendant relied on
articles published by the National Restaurant Association and the Texas
Restaurant Association, as well as his attorney, in his belief that he did not
need to obtain a music license.7
This confusion is due to the ambiguous statutory language, and the
seemingly arbitrary criteria courts have employed in finding copyright
infringement. In response to this confusion, restaurant associations are
sponsoring a federal bill extending the current exemption to cover the
playing of background music in establishments.'
State Authors and Composers ("SESAC, Inc."). 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.19, at 8-264 (1995).
The purpose of these performance rights groups is to "reduce the transactional and
enforcement costs that would otherwise be incurred in reaching agreements with each individual
copyright holder." Chi-Boy Music v. Charlie Club, Inc., 930 F.2d 1224, 1226 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991)
(citing BMI v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1979)).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1994); see, e.g., id. § 110(1) (use of works by nonprofit educational
institutions for instruction); id. § 110(2)(A) (use of works directly related to instruction by
education or governmental bodies); id. § 110(3) (performance of a religious work in a religious
context).
5. Id. § 110(5).
6. 688 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
7. Id. at 1175.
8. H.R. 789, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1995). Hearings on 104 H.R. 789 (introduced Feb.
2, 1995) are tentatively scheduled for Fall, 1996. Pamela E. Foster, Music Industry in a Row over
Song Rights Bill, NASHVILLE Bus. J., Mar. 20, 1995, § I (statement of Doug Sweeney, legislative
correspondent for Rep. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-Wis.)). H.R. 789 and companion bill S. 1137
are identical with respect to the proposed § 110(5) changes. The Senate bill also includes a
provision informing the public when a work will fall into the public domain. S. 1137, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1995).
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This Comment will focus on the current § 110(5) exemption and the
courts' varied and often seemingly inconsistent interpretations of the
exemption as it applies to restaurants. Part II will briefly introduce the
prima facie elements of copyright infringement and the development of the
small business exemption. Part III will analyze the requirements of the
small business exemption, and will examine the difficulties courts face
when reconciling the language of the statute with legislative intent. The
prevalent theme is that the present case law follows neither congressional
intent nor statutory language and that the exemption needs to be redefined
to allow for consistency. Finally, Part IV will examine proposed House
Bill 789 ("Fairness in Musical Licensing Act of 1995") 9 and its effect on
both copyright holders and copyright law. The author concludes by
explaining why passage of the Bill will clarify the law and allow for
predictability and fairness to both business owners and copyright holders.
II. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT THROUGH A PUBLIC PERFORMANCE
The Copyright Act confers to copyright holders the exclusive right to
publicly perform their work.'" This right allows the copyright holder the
power to authorize any public displays of his or her work, and to seek
damages if that right is infringed. An infringing performance of a work
does not have to be live or verbatim." The performance may be from
memory" or by playing a recording of the work. 3  Playing a copy-
righted work without permission constitutes infringment.
A. Prima Facie Elements of Copyright Infringement
In order to establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the
plaintiff must show: (1) that there was an unauthorized public performance
of a copyrighted work, and (2) that no statutory exemptions will relieve the
performance from copyright laws.'4
9. H.R. 789, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1995) proposes to amend 17 U.S.C. § 110(5), as well
as provisions regarding arbitration in fee negotiations between performance rights groups and
businesses. Id. For purposes of this Comment, only § 2 of the Bill will be discussed.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994).
11. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 8.14, at 8-164 n.8.
12. Id.
13. Id. § 8.14, at 8-165.
14. David A. Gerber, The "Small Business Exemption "from Copyright Liability: An Illusory
Doctrine?, 1989 ENT. PUB. & THE ARTS HANDBOOK 11, 12 (Robert Thorne et al. eds., 1989); see
also BMI v. Hartnax Corp., No. 88-C2856, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12104 (N.D. Il. 1989).
1996]
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1. Performance
A copyright infringement action may only be brought if there is an
unauthorized performance of a copyrighted work. Section 106(4) of the
1976 Copyright Act gives authors of audiovisual or musical works the
exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly."' 5 All other
performances must be licensed by the copyright holder or an agent of the
holder. The Copyright Act defines "perform" as "to recite, render, play,
dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process."' 6
Devices or processes include "all kinds of equipment for reproducing [or
amplifying] sounds or visual images, any sort of transmitting or amplifying
apparatus, any type of electronic retrieval system, and any other techniques
and systems not yet in use or even invented."' 7 These broad definitions
indicate that reproduction of a copyrighted work by any means results in
a performance. Playing an album or even singing a work constitutes a
performance of that work. Even the act of turning on the radio constitutes
a performance of the songs which come over the airwaves because it is the
use of an "electronic retrieval system"'" which recites the copyrighted
work.
2. Publicly
Copyright infringement cannot occur unless first, an unauthorized
performance of a work occurs, and second, the performance occurs in
"public."' 9 Section 101 states that a work is performed "publicly" if done
"at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number
of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintan-
ces is gathered."20  Thus, performances in "semi-public" places such as
15. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994).
16. Id. § 101.
17. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 8.14[B], at 8-168 (1995).
18. Id.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
20. Id. § 101. Although this definition appears simplistic, it presents some interpretative
problems. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, courts interpreted the statutory language to mean that
as long as the performance was restricted to a particular group, meaning not available to the
general public, that performance was not public. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v.
Wyatt, 21 Copy. Dec. 203 (D. Md. 1932). A problem with this interpretation is that the group
could consist of 5 or 100 persons, but the performance would still not be a public performance
because the audience is "restricted." 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 8.14[C], at 8-172
to 8-173. Presumably, then, a large concert could be considered a non-public performance since
its audience is restricted to those holding tickets. This interpretation has been abandoned in favor
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clubs and prisons constitute a public performance. 21 The 1976 Copyright
Act, however, clearly indicates that where the audience is limited to family
members and invited friends, the performance is not public.2
Under these broad definitions, the act of turning on a radio in a
restaurant constitutes a "public performance."23 Therefore, unless the
performance falls within an enumerated exception, the performance
constitutes copyright infringement. Congress has provided several
exemptions where the public may perform a copyrighted work without fear
of infringement.24 Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act represents one
such exception. The section reads in pertinent part:
[T]he following are not infringements of copyright:
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a
performance or display of a work by the public reception
of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a
kind commonly used in private homes, unless -
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the
transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further trans-
mitted to the public."
Often called the "small business exemption,, 2 6 the section allows owners
of "Mom and Pop '27 establishments to play music without incurring
liability for copyright infringement.
of a new rationale. The present approach only requires that a "'public' performance... be
'open' to, that is, available to a substantial number of persons. It is not necessary that they in
fact attend or receive the performance." Id. § 8.14[C], at 8-173 to 8-174 (citations omitted).
21. See Fermata Int'l Melodies, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1257, 1260
(S.D. Tex. 1989) (golf club held to be a public place), aff'd mem., 915 F.2d 1467 (5th Cir. 1990);
Hinton v. Mainlands of Tamarac, 611 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (music performance at a
clubhouse dance is public); Op. Cal. Att'y Gen., 1981-1982 Copy. Dec. (CCH) 25,368 (Feb.
5, 1982) (showing videotapes of motion pictures to prison inmates constitutes a public
performance). Contra Op. La. Att'y Gen., 1985-1986 Copy. Dec. (CCH) 25,833 (Jan. 10,
1985).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
23. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1974).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 110; e.g.. id. § 110(1) (use of works by nonprofit educational institutions
for instruction); id. § 110(2) (use of works directly related to instruction by educational or
governmental bodies); id. § 110(3) (performance of a religious work in a religious context).
25. Id. § 110(5).
26. Gerber, supra note 14, at 11.
27. Id.
1996]
716 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
B. Development of the Small Business Exception Language Through
Twentieth Century v. Aiken
The small business exemption developed from three cases28 which
culminated with Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken.29  The Aiken
court, after examining existing law,3" concluded that defendant Aiken, by
turning on his radio, did not "perform" within the meaning of the
Copyright Act. 3' The court's rationale followed two lines of cases dealing
with cable television 32 and "extend[ed] [the] interpretation of the scope of
the 1909 statute's right of 'public performance for profit' to a situation
outside the [cable television] context. 33
In Aiken, the defendant owned a fast-food restaurant equipped with
"[a] single radio connection to four separate loud speakers furnish[ing]
background music through normal radio programming"34 which he left on
throughout the day. The defendant did not have a performing license and
was sued for copyright infringement of two ASCAP-licensed songs which
were broadcast over the radio. 35 Because infringement requires that a
"performance" take place, the case turned on the construction of what
constituted a "performance" under the Copyright Act.36
The Aiken court applied the functional test37 articulated in Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. ,3 and found that both
28. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1974), aftrd, 422 U.S.
151 (1975); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, reh "g denied, 393 U.S.
902 (1968); Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
29. 500 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 131 (discussing Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829
(S.D.N.Y. 1926), and Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929)).
31. Id. at 137.
32. Id. at 134-37; Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1973).
33. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5701.
34. Aiken, 500 F.2d at 128.
35. Id. at 129.
36. Id. at 130.
37. Id. The Aiken court announced: "We find no distinction between the two technologies
of radio and CATV which would require us to reach a different result than that reached in
Fortnightly .. " Id. at 137 n.22.
38. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). In Fortnightly, United Artists Television ("United Artists") sued
Fortnightly, a cable television corporation that provided television broadcasts to two communities
in West Virginia, for copyright infringement. United Artists was the copyright holder of motion
pictures which were received by Fortnightly and then retransmitted to its customers without a
license. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 392-93.
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Aiken and Fortnightly merely "provid[ed] equipment to convert electronic
signals into audible sound."3 9 The Court reasoned that since Aiken was
a viewer, he did not "perform" within the meaning of copyright law by
merely turning on the radio in his restaurant.40 Thus, Aiken did not
infringe the plaintiffs' copyrights.
The ruling in Aiken contradicts the expansive definitions of the
Copyright Act, which considers turning on a radio in a public place as a
public performance of the broadcasted songs. Since Aiken did not secure
permission from the copyright holders, the Court should have ruled that
Aiken infringed the plaintiff's copyrights. Justice Stewart, however,
foresaw the "practical unenforceability of a ruling that all of those in
Aiken's position are copyright infringers."' If the Court held Aiken
liable for copyright infringement, the implication would be that all
establishments which use radios would also be copyright infringers. "One
has only to consider the countless business establishments in this country
with radio ... sets on their premises.., to realize the total futility of any
evenhanded effort on the part of copyright holders to license even a
substantial percentage of them."'42 Economically, the Court also felt that
the radio station's licensing fees provided adequate compensation to the
copyright owner, and that additional fees from the restaurant were
The Supreme Court in Fortnightly rejected the "quantitative" test of Jewell-LaSalle and
articulated a "functional" test in interpreting the word "performance." 392 U.S. at 396-99.
Unlike the Jewell-LaSalle "quantitative" test, which focuses on "[h]ow much... the [infringer
did) to bring about the viewing and hearing of a copyrighted work," Aiken, 500 F.2d at 133 n. 14,
the functional test "depends upon a determination of the function that is played by [cable
television] in the overall process of telecasting and reception." Id. at 134. The Court noted:
Television viewing results from combined activity by broadcasters and viewers-
.... The television broadcaster in one sense does less than the exhibitor of a
motion picture or stage play; he [or she] supplies his [or her] audience not with
visible images but only with electronic signals. The viewer conversely does more
than a member of a theater audience; he [or she] provides the equipment to convert
electronic signals into audible sound and visible images.... Broadcasters perform.
Viewers do not perform.... One [broadcaster] is treated as active performer; the
other [viewer], as passive beneficiary.
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398.
Following this analogy, the Court determined that Fortnightly's activities were more like
the viewer's. Id. at 399. Because Fortnightly's primary purpose was to enhance its customer's
ability to receive signals, and not to directly broadcast any signals into homes, Fortnightly did not
"perform" within the meaning of the Copyright Act, and therefore did not commit copyright
infringement. Id.
39. Fortnightly, 392 U.S at 397-400.
40. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162.
41. Id.
42. Id.
1996]
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unnecessary.43 After these policy considerations, the Court held that
Aiken's simple act of turning on the radio in his restaurant did not
consititute copyright infringement.
Congress responded to the decision by revising the Copyright Act.
The revision adopted the outcome of Aiken, but overruled the Court's
application of "performance." Congress considered Aiken's actions
infringing, but wanted to exempt him and those like him from licensing
requirements for the reasons which Justice Stewart expressed in his opinion.
It is this attempt to combine a broad definition of "performance," yet to
still allow "Mom and Pop" stores to play radio music without fear of
copyright infringement, that resulted in the § 110(5) "small business
exemption."
Interestingly, in its revision, Congress rejected the definition of
"perform" used in Fortnightly and Aiken in favor of Jewell-LaSalle 's
broader reading. In essence, § 110(5) rejects the Aiken decision, restoring
the rationale of Jewell-LaSalle, "under which public communication by
means other than a home receiving set, or further transmission of a
broadcast to the public, is considered an infringing act."'45 This decision
is largely unexplained. Congress then went on to specifically state that
although it accepted the pre-Aiken interpretation of Jewell-LaSalle, it
intended to exempt situations in which "a small commercial establishment
... [uses] a home receiver with four ordinary loudspeakers grouped within
a relatively narrow circumference from the set. ' 6 Thus, while Aiken
"performed" within the meaning of the Copyright Act, this performance
does not require a license. However, Aiken would represent "the outer
limit" of the exemption.47 This "outer limit" language has presented many
interpretative problems which courts have been attempting to resolve.
III. THE SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPTION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAWS
To qualify for the small business exemption of the copyright law, an
establishment must meet four factors. The establishment in question must:
43. Id. at 163.
44. Gerber, supra note 14, at 11.
45. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5701.
46. Bernard Korman, Performance Rights in Music Under Section 110 and 118 of the 1976
Copyright Act, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 521, 532 n.58 (1977) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976)).
47. Id.
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(1) be a small commercial establishment;" (2) not make a "direct charge"
to hear the music;49 (3) employ a "single receiving apparatus of a kind
commonly used in private homes; ' 0 and finally, (4) "the performances
must not be further transmitted to the public."'"
While the factors are generally accepted in most courts, each element
of the exemption presents problems in its interpretation and application.
Part III will introduce and evaluate some of the approaches courts employ
in interpreting the requirements of the small business exemption.
A. The Establishment Must Be a Small Commercial Establishment
The first requirement for a small business exemption is that the
establishment be a small commercial establishment.5 2 This requirement
stems from the legislative history which called for an examination of the
business to determine if it was large enough to merit subscription to a
commercial music service such as Muzak. 3 Congress denies the small
business exemption to restaurants "of sufficient size to justify, as a practical
matter, a subscription to a commercial background music service."5 4 In
determining whether a business qualifies as a small commercial establish-
48. Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. Mont. 1990).
49. 17 U.S.C. § I I0(5)(A) (1994).
50. Id. § 110(5). Some courts further divide this factor into two separate elements. "The
exception is available only if (1) a single receiving apparatus is used, (2) the single receiving
apparatus is of a kind commonly used in private homes." Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini,
55 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting BMI, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d 1482,
1489 (7th Cir. 1991)).
51. International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988); see also
17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (1994).
52. Hickory Grove Music, 749 F. Supp. at 1038.
53. H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5816. Muzak began in 1934, and is today "the world's largest provider of business music."
Birthday Presence: No Dancing in the Elevators, Please, Oct. 3, 1994 (Muzak promotional
literature) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Birthday
Presence]. The music provider operates twelve music channels, eleven of which play original
artist recordings. The environmental music channel is Muzak's most popular channel. It is
"designed to be less obtrusive and for it, vocals are removed from all of the tracks in special
Muzak arrangements." Sound Affects, supra note 2, at 1. In addition to music programming,
Muzak also provides satellite-broadcast business music networks, data transmission, and in-store
visual messaging for businesses all over the world. Id. To date, Muzak has 34 company-owned
and 189 independent sales locations throughout the world. Birthday Presence, at 2.
54. H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5816. Lack of financial statistics, however, is not crucial to a ruling on summary judgment.
Hickory Grove Music, 749 F. Supp. at 1038.
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ment, courts examine the restaurant's square footage and annual rev-
enues,5 5 although neither factor is explicitly identified in the legislative
history.56 Based on these facts, courts determine whether the establish-
ment qualifies for exemption from the copyright law.57
1. The Physical Size of the Establishment
Analysis of an establishment's size is the least arbitrary of the factors
enumerated for the small business exemption. 8 Failure to satisfy this
element automatically disqualifies a business from obtaining an exemp-
tion. 9 To determine whether an establishment qualifies as a small
business, courts compare the square footage of the establishment in
question to that of Aiken's store.60 Aiken's store had 620 square feet
open to the public. 61  With one exception,62 "the determination of
whether the public area of an establishment exceeds 620 square feet has
proven to be a fairly accurate indicator as to the establishment's qual-
ification for the exemption. 63 Establishments exceeding 620 square feet
of public space fail to qualify for the exemption, whereas those with less
than 620 square feet may fall within the exemption.
55. See Crabshaw Music v. K-Bob's of El Paso, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 763, 767 (W.D. Tex.
1990) (store with public area of 7000 square feet and annual revenues of $800,000 to $900,000
not exempt); International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 655, 658 (N.D. I11. 1987),
aft'd, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988) (business which covered 2640 square feet and had $35,000
to $136,000 in annual net profits not a small commercial establishment); Merrill v. County Stores,
Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (D.N.H. 1987) (exemption not available where store was 13,000
square feet and annual sales were $2.5 million).
56. John Wilk, Seeing the Words and Hearing the Music: Contradictions in the
Construction of 17 US.C. Section 110(5), 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 783, 814 (1993).
57. See Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (D. Mont. 1990) (citing
BMI v. Hartmarx Corp., No. 88 C 2856, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12104 (N.D. Ill. 1989)); Gnossos
Music v. Quido DiPompo, 1989 Copy. Dec. (CCH) 26,483 at 22,937 (D. Me. 1989);
International Korwin Corp., 665 F. Supp. at 658 ("given both [the restaurant's] physical size and
substantial revenues, the Orbit is a large enough establishment to accommodate a background
music service."). Id.
58. Wilk, supra note 56, at 812.
59. Hickory Grove Music, 749 F. Supp. at 1039. The Hickory Grove court determined that
the defendants' 880 square foot establishment "exceed[ed] the public area in Aiken [620 square
feet]. On this basis alone, defendants have failed to show their restaurant is a 'small commercial
establishment' as contemplated by the § 110(5) exemption." Id.
60. See Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Tex. 1988);
International Korwin Corp., 665 F. Supp. at 652; Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp.
923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd per curiam, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945
(1992).
61. Gnossos Music v. Quido DiPompo, 1989 Copy. Dec. (CCH) 26,483 (D. Me. 1989).
62. Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113, 1114 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
63. Wilk, supra note 56, at 813.
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In Sailor Music v. The Gap Stores, Inc.,' Sailor Music sued Gap, a
well-known chain store, for copyright infringement arising out of a radio
broadcast in two of Gap's New York stores.65  The court noted that the
average size of Gap stores (3500 square feet) was larger than Aiken's shop
(1055 square feet), and was "of sufficient size to-justify, as a practical
matter, a subscription to a commercial background music service.' 66 After
reviewing all of the factors, the appellate court affirmed the district court's
determination that the defendants engaged in a public performance, and
therefore had infringed Sailor Music's copyrighted works.67  The court
applied a strict reading of the "outer limit" language, and concluded that
the Gap store exceeded the outer limit of congressional allowance.
6 8
2. The Establishment's Financial Size or Ability to Pay
for a Commercial Music Service
In addition to the square footage, courts also review the revenue of
the establishment. This factor stems from Congress' intent to the grant
exemption to business establishments not large enough to "justify . .. a
subscription to a commercial background music service. 69 Courts have
not offered an explanation of the nexus between the financial ability to
subscribe to a commercial music service and copyright infringement.70
No case has ever used this factor as the sole reason to refuse granting the
64. 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd per curiam, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982). For a discussion of the case, see Robert Cash, Sailor Music:
Exposing the Gaps in 17 U.S.C. § 110(5), 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 133 (1982).
65. Sailor Music, 516 F. Supp. at 923-24.
66. Id. at 925 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5816).
67. Sailor Music, 668 F.2d at 86.
68. Id.
69. BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324, 1332-33 (N.D. Iil. 1991). In
Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985), the district court
held that a golf course qualified for the § 110(5) exemption because it was not a business "of
sufficient size to justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a commercial background music
service." Id. at 1118-19 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)). Unlike
Aiken's restaurant, which "operated year-round, did a brisk business, and undoubtedly generated
substantial revenues," the golf course was only open six months per year and generated less than
$6000 during that period. Id. at 1119. The court held that, although the golf course did generate
revenue, it was not substantial enough to justify subscription to a commercial music service.
Id.
70. Wilk, supra note 56, at 814; Susan A. Maslow, Comment, "Watts" the Perimeter of the
Doctrine of the Communication of a Radio Broadcast Under Section 110(5) of the Copyright
Act?, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 1056, 1092 n.184 (1984).
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§ 110(5) exemption;7 thus the weight given to a business' financial status
is still questionable.72
3. Criticism of the "Small Commercial Establishment" Requirement
The current standards promulgated by the courts also ignore
considerations of whether a business actually wants, needs, or benefits from
a commercial music service.73 The rationale for the current view appears
to be a policy that restaurants of a certain size and financial status should
not receive the benefits of free music. This assertion is supported by the
fact that even if a large establishment chooses to obtain its music from
radio broadcasts, it must still obtain a license if it is "large enough to be a
potential customer of a background music service."74  However, the
unpredictable interpretations of this requirement have not garnered
acceptance from all the courts.
Some courts have refused to apply the "small commercial establish-
ment" standard.75 These criticizing courts refuse to analyze an establish-
ment's size or revenue, stating instead that:
although the legislative history may . . . help a court discover
the statute's meaning, it may not be used to change it....
The text of the § 110(5) includes nothing at all about the
size of a business, the area that it covers, or the revenue that it
generates.... [Legislative history may not] be used to supply
additional elements beyond those specified in the statute.76
So, while legislative history suggests that Congress intended to provide an
exemption to the "Mom and Pop" restaurant, these courts point out that
§ 110(5) does not articulate a test based upon a restaurant's size or revenue,
but rather on the type of equipment employed by the establishment. 7  The
71. BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1492 (7th Cir. 1991); see BMI v. United
States Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982); Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982).
72. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. at 1334 (disapproving the revenues analysis,
pronouncing the "examination of a store's revenues and profits to be of minimal importance").
73. In Sailor Music, defendants noted that they had attempted to subscribe to a commercial
service but found the subscription either inadequate or too expensive. Sailor Music, 668 F.2d at
84.
74. Korman, supra note 46, at 534. Mr. Korman is general counsel of ASCAP.
75. BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991); Edison Bros. Stores, Inc.
v. BMI, 760 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992).
76. BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324, 1333 (N.D. 111. 1991), aff'd, 949
F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992).
77. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 760 F. Supp. at 771; Paul Warenski, Copyrights and
Background Music: Unplug the Radio Before I Infringe Again, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
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Eighth Circuit summed up the criticism by offering that "[i]f Congress
intended to impose a physical size limitation on the establishment
qualifying for the exemption, it might easily have written it into the
statute."78
Nevertheless, courts still examine an establishment's physical and
financial size in order to determine if it qualifies for the exemption.
Another problem is that the square footage and revenue factors presume
that establishments exceeding a critical certain size and revenue can afford
a commercial music service and should be required to subscribe to one.
This presumption is neither rationalized nor explained by the courts or by
Congress.79 One theory is that a commercial service may be more
suitable to provide music to a larger establishment.0 This assumption,
however, ignores several facts about commercial music services and
musical preferences.
The square footage factor for determining availability of the
exemption focuses on the physical area of the establishment. Commercial
services, however, provide programming and reception of certain musical
selections." While they do provide their subscribers with sound equip-
ment, it is not their main service.82 Thus, the equipment provided by the
music services does not provide a justification for the distinction between
large and small establishments.
A third argument may be that the musical programming offered by
commercial music services are better suited to larger establishments. This
argument ignores the fact that musical programming depends upon personal
taste and choice, and not upon the size of the venue where the music will
be heard.3 Perhaps courts are attempting to promote the idea that music
from a commercial service is more suitable for establishments exceeding
a certain size---that of Aiken's fast food restaurant. But the rationale for
this assertion remains unknown. The lack of a fixed standard results in a
case-by-case determination in which a restaurant of 620 square feet of
523, 541 (1992).
78. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc v. BMI, 954 F.2d 1419, 1424 (8th Cir. 1992).
79. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d at 1491 (inquiring how the financial size of a business
relates to the exemption).
80. Wilk, supra note 56, at 815.
81. See McDermott, supra note 2, at 70; Maslow, supra note 70, at 1089-90.
82. For a listing of Muzak services and products, see Sound Affects, supra note 2.
83. While equipment may be chosen with the size of the establishment in mind, music is
usually selected based on its intended purpose. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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public space is allowed to claim the exemption, but stores of 2769 square
feet or larger are outside of the exemption.8
4
Neither Congress nor the courts have articulated a financial standard
for determining which establishments must subscribe to a commercial
music service.85 No reasonable justification for the vague standards that
are in place has been offered. Implicit in the revenue analysis is the as-
sumption that restaurants exceeding a certain revenue level can afford
commercial music service. 6 Yet, the revenue analysis does not consider
whether the business makes a profit. 87 Currently, the law requires a high-
revenue business to subscribe to a commercial music service despite the
fact that the business may actually be operating at a loss. It appears that
unless an establishment is on the brink of bankruptcy, it will not qualify for
the small business exemption. 8 If a court wished to carry the requirement
to an extreme, solvent small businesses that were meant to be exempt
would need to license background music on the theory they are as able to
pay for the service as large establishments.89 The exemption would
become "de minimis," available only to establishments on the brink of
bankruptcy.90
Despite the widespread acceptance of the size and revenue tests, the
courts have not satisfactorily reconciled congressional intent to exempt
small business establishments from copyright laws with statutory language.
The "small business establishment" requirement of the exemption presents
courts with interpretive problems, as it currently calls for an examination
of the size and revenues of an establishment, neither of which receive
mention in the statute.
B. Patrons Cannot Be Charged to Hear the Music
A second requirement to qualify for a small business exemption to the
copyright law is that an establishment must not directly charge patrons to
84. Maslow, supra note 70, at 1091.
85. BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324, 1333 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 949 F.2d
1482 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992) (noting that while Congress could have
easily articulated a financial standard, it did not do so).
86. Wilk, supra note 56, at 816; see also Maslow, supra note 70, at 1092 n. 184 (proposing
that there may be a relationship between square footage and revenue because larger establishments
generally require higher gross receipts to cover rent).
87. See Henry Sellin, ATrORNEY's HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING § 5.01[2] (3d ed. 1994)
(discussion of net income).
88. Gerber, supra note 14, at 13-14.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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hear the music.9' The "direct charge" factor is an easily measured
objective criterion, and has not presented the courts with the same problems
that plague the other three factors. Restaurants satisfy this factor if they do
not specifically charge their customers for listening to the music. Most
restaurants do not separately charge their patrons for background music,
thus satisfying this portion of the test.92
C. The Stereo Equipment Must Be a "Single Receiving Apparatus of a
Kind Commonly Used in Private Homes"
93
The third requirement for an exemption focuses on the type of
receiving system employed in the restaurant. In deciding whether a
restaurant qualifies for the exemption, courts examine the nature of the
"receiving apparatus" (the sound system) in the establishment.9" A music
user fails this requirement in one of two ways: (1) by using non-home-type
components, or (2) by using home-type components in a configuration
inconsistent with home use.95
This factor is the most difficult to analyze because though it is clear
that Congress "intended the exemption to apply only to stereo systems that
produce music over a limited area,"96 it did not set a "hard and fast
rule"9 7 to guide the courts or business owners in determining which stereo
system equipment or configurations qualify for the exemption. Instead,
Congress set out several factors which should be considered. These factors
include:
the size, physical arrangement, and noise level of the areas
within the establishment where the transmissions are made
audible or visible, and the extent to which the receiving
apparatus is altered or augmented for the purpose of improving
91. See Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995); BMI v. Claire's
Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991); Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp.
1031 (D. Mont. 1990).
92. BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991); BMI v. Edison Bros.
Stores, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994).
94. See, e.g., Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990); Sailor
Music, Inc. v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982).
95. Hickory Grove, 749 F. Supp. at 1037. See generally Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini,
55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995).
96. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d at 1493-94.
97. Id. at 1493.
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the aural or visual quality of the performance for individual
members of the public using those areas."
What types or configurations of stereo components constitute an
infringement is unclear. Congress neglected to articulate detailed
specifications, but explicitly stated that the facts of Aiken "represent the
outer limit of the exemption." 99 Use of the "outer limit" language may
suggest that Congress intended to exempt only small establishments such
as Aiken's; still, such a possibility would not mean that all electronic
equipment more complex than Aiken's would be automatically denied
exemption from copyright laws.'00
The congressional report and statutory language, however, do not
support this interpretation. 101 Assuming that Aiken's stereo configuration,
and not the size of the restaurant, represents the "outer limit" of the
exemption, the use of an augmented receiving apparatus more sophisticated
than that used in Aiken's restaurant would not automatically disqualify a
restaurant from a small business exemption.0 2 Courts, which accept the
physical and financial size test, have not declared this factor as a dis-
positive test for the exemption.
0 3
In Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc.,"° the defendant owned
and operated an outdoor miniature golf course next to its roller rink in
North Carolina. ASCAP alleged that the defendant committed copyright
infringement when songs were broadcast through the golf course's radio
and speaker system.'0 5 It was undisputed that the six speakers, "mounted
on light poles interspersed over the 7,500 square foot area of the course-
... [did] not project well, and [could] be heard without distortion only at
a close proximity" from the speakers."°
98. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5701. "Aiken 's utility in interpreting specific factors mentioned in the legislative history is
questionable, since these factors were not discussed in the Supreme Court's decision." Wilk,
supra note 56, at 801.
99. H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5701.
100. H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5816.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5701.
102. Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985) ("When
due weight is given to each of the factors... the slightly larger number of speakers. . . standing
alone" does not disqualify a business from exemption.). Id. at 1119.
103. See, e.g., id. at 1117-18.
104. 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
105. Id. at 1114.
106. Id.
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The district court refused to use the number of speakers as a
dispositive factor in evaluating whether the defendant would qualify for the
exemption.107 In particular, the court rejected the approach employed by
other courts when evaluating the nature of the "receiving apparatus.' ' 8
Rather than simply comparing the physical arrangement and the number of
speakers with the system in Aiken, the court focused on congressional
intent, placing emphasis on the "noise level and audibility" of songs
transmitted over the defendant's loudspeakers.' 9 The court noted that
due to the poor quality of the speakers, and because the system was out-
doors," the "noise level of the areas within the establishment where the
transmissions are made audible""' is not of the same quality as that in
Sailor Music or in United States Shoe Corp. Hence, the district court
concluded that the stereo system in the golf course was "inferior to those
involved in the Aiken case.
'' u2
Although this prong is universally accepted by the courts, courts differ
in how they analyze the stereo system, and how much importance to attach
to this factor. Because § 110(5) was intended to adopt Aiken, courts use
the physical arrangement and components of Aiken's radio as the standard.
Systems more complicated than Aiken's would not qualify as an "apparatus
of a kind commonly used in private homes,"' 1 3 while systems smaller
than Aiken's would receive an exemption from the copyright laws." 4
The problem is that some courts evaluate the entire system as a whole,'
5
while others consider each component of the system separately."6
Even in jurisdictions that evaluate individual components, the courts
add that "individual components of a system may be commonly used in
107. Id. at 1119.
108. Id. at 1117-18.
109. Springsteen, 602 F. Supp. at 1118.
110. Id.
111. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5656, 5701.
112. Springsteen, 602 F. Supp. at 1118.
113. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994).
114. See Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Tex. 1988)
(2 speakers spaced 30 feet apart); Lamminations Music v. P&X Markets, Inc., 1985 Copyright
L. Dec. (CCH) 25,790 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 617 F. Supp.
1021, 1023 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
affd per curiam, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982).
115. Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995). "The focus, we
stressed, must be on the entire audio reproduction system." Id. at 267.
116. Merrill, 688 F. Supp. at 1174. But see Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp.
1031 (D. Mont. 1990). "[C]ourts must examine the entire system and the context of its use,
rather than focusing on individual components." Id. at 1037.
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homes, [but] the whole apparatus once installed may not qualify as a
'home-type' system"'" 7 which would exempt transmissions from copy-
right laws.
Analysis of a defendant's stereo system also includes an investigation
into how the components are arranged or attached. Specifically, courts
focusing on the placement of the receiver in relation to the speakers have
held that where the receiver and speakers were in different rooms, the
system was not a type commonly found in the home."8 Systems that are
not "of a type commonly used in a private home"1 9 include those with
concealed receivers to speaker wires 2' and systems with recessed
mounted speakers.'
In May 1995, the Seventh Circuit examined the applicability of the
§ 110(5) exemption in Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini.'22 Defendant
Muedini played music in his restaurant and was sued for infringing rights
of copyrighted works without first obtaining a license from ASCAP' 23
The Seventh Circuit held that the facts of the case satisfied the re-
quirements of § 110(5) that (1) a single receiving apparatus was used, and
(2) that no charge was made to listen to the music.
24
The main issue of the case was determining whether the stereo system
used was of similar to the types used in private homes. 125  Rather than
adopting Springsteen or articulating another test, the court declared that it
"need not decide ... whether a certain number of speakers is the absolute
limit that may be attributed to a 'homestyle' set. What [constitutes] 'a
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes' must
be determined on a case-by-case basis."' 126 The court went on to hold,
117. Hickory Grove Music, 749 F. Supp. at 1037 (citing Merrill, 688 F. Supp. at 1174).
118. See, e.g., International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988)
(receiver in office while speakers throughout restaurant not an arrangement commonly found in
homes).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994).
120. International Korwin Corp., 855 F.2d at 378 (hidden wiring is "not commonly found
in homes"); Merrill, 688 F. Supp. at 1175 (sound system with 40 feet of concealed wiring not
common home use); Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
121. International Korwin Corp., 855 F.2d at 378 (recessed speakers are "not commonly
found in homes"); Gnossos Music v. Quido DiPompo, 1989 Copy. Dec. (CCH) 26,483 (D. Me.
1989) (portable stereo receiver connected to eight recessed ceiling speakers is commercial in
nature).
122. 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995).
123. Id. at 265.
124. Id. at 268.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994); Cass County, 55 F.3d at 269.
126. Cass County, 55 F.3d at 269 (citing BMI v. United States Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816,
817 (9th Cir. 1982) (in which the court noted that the phrase "commonly used in the private
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however, that due to the added components, the augmented system "cannot
be characterized fairly as composed of only home-type components, nor can
it be said to be configured in a manner commonly found in a home."'27
Thus, defendant's electronic equipment was not one that would be common
to the home, and was not entitled to the § 110(5) exemption. 2 '
2. An Alternative Approach to the Narrow Reading
of Congressional Language
A literal application of Congress' "outer limit" language poses
problems. Rather than defining which type of apparatus represents "home
type," the courts' use of Aiken as a rigid standard fails to take into
consideration the technological advances in sound equipment.'29
An alternative approach focuses on the latter portion of the test which
requires that the receiver be of a type "commonly used in private
homes."' O3 The advantage of this approach is that instead of comparing
the spatial arrangement and specifics of a defendant's sound system to
those in Aiken, it provides a more flexible definition of what types of sound
systems are ordinarily found in a private home.13' This approach would
allow the standard to account for technological advances. The current
standard derived from Aiken means that only a handful of today's electronic
equipment actually falls under the exemption.
Different results are obtained under the current proposed analyses.
For example, under the present, literal approach, restaurants using a stereo
with greater than four speakers would not satisfy this portion of the small
business exception test.'32 Using the alternative stereo receiver-based
analysis, the number of speakers would not be a predetermined number, but
could vary as technology progresses.
33
home" is understandable to a person of "ordinary intelligence," and is not vague)). Id.
127. Id. at 268.
128. Id. at 269.
129. Gerber, supra note 14, at 14.
130. Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, lnc, 516 F. Supp. 923, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). "There is a
factual dispute between the parties' experts as to whether or not the particular components used
in these two Gap stores are actually 'commonly used in private homes,' and consequently the
court cannot grant summary judgment on this basis." Id.; see Gerber, supra note 14, at 14.
131. See generally Gerber, supra note 14.
132. See International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988) (stereo
with eight speakers held not to be a receiver "commonly used in the home"); Gnossos Music v.
Guido diPompo, 1989 Copy. Dec. (CCH) 26,483 (D. Me. 1989); Springsteen v. Plaza Roller
Dome, Inc, 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (six speakers, compared with four speakers in
Aiken's shop).
133. Gerber, supra note 14, at 14.
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Of course, this method is not without flaws. A flexible receiver-based
standard would raise different issues from the current Aiken test. Under
this "flexible" standard, courts would need to define what "ordinary"
means, and how an "ordinary" household uses receivers and speakers.
34
The question of whether "ordinary" should be defined according to the
community or geographical location of the alleged infringer, or according
to a national standard, would also need to be resolved.'35 Different
community interpretations of "ordinary" could lead to inconsistent results
throughout the country.
Thus, this approach may have undesirable effects precisely due to its
flexibility. A local definition of "ordinary" could result in a particular
establishment being liable for copyright infringement in one jurisdiction but
not in another. A national standard, however, may yield unfair holdings if
the standard is set below what is commonly understood or accepted in
particular regions of the country.'36 Another possible pitfall of using the
proposed approach is a complete exemption if home receivers advance to
the stage where augmentation is no longer necessary. Despite this
possibility, a receiver-based test has the advantage of being flexible enough
to keep up with technology and allow proprietors to use "home type"
systems which would not otherwise qualify for the exemption under Aiken
standards.
D. The Broadcast Must Not Be "Further Transmitted to the Public"
The fourth element for a business to qualify for a small business
exemption requires that the transmission received is not "further transmitted
to the public.' 37  The Copyright Act defines "transmit" as "to com-
municate . . . by any device or process whereby images or sounds are
received beyond the place from which they are sent.'
138
Courts have traditionally looked to two factors in analyzing whether
an establishment retransmits the sound. The two factors are the size of the
establishment and the physical arrangement of the sound system. 39 In
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (1994).
138. Id. § 101.
139. See Little Mole Music v. Mavar's Supermarket, No. 4, 1989 Copy. Dec. (CCH)
26,440, at 22,735 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
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Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc.,' 4 the district court noted that further
transmission was a function of the size of the store,14 1 yet the relationship
between the size of the store and retransmission is unclear. The Sailor
Music court compared the average sizes of Gap stores to the 620 square
foot Aiken store, and noted that Gap stores were substantially larger.
42
Thus, "[b]y virtue of the size of... Gap stores, the radio transmissions
received on the radio receivers and played via the recessed loud speakers
[were] 'further transmitted to the public.""
'143
Other courts interpret the word "transmission" as the electrical signal
traveling through the wire from the receiver to the speaker.'" This
concept from congressional language that a broadcast "is further transmitted
[when it is heard] beyond the place where the receiving apparatus is
located."' 45  Under this interpretation, a second transmission occurs
whenever the receiver and the speakers are located in different rooms. 
46
Under this definition of "transmit," a proprietor, by placing his receiver and
speakers in separate rooms, would be guilty of "further transmit[ting]" a
broadcast. 47  The same proprietor could, however, avoid a further
transmission of the radio broadcast if the components were moved to the
same room.
There are two possible explanations for the bar against retransmis-
sions. Recall that the first requirement in establishing a copyright violation
140. 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aft'd, 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982). In Sailor Music, copyright owners sued Gap Stores for copyright
infringement. Gap played radio music in its stores through loudspeakers connected to a radio
receiver. Gap argued that it qualified for the § 110(5) exemption, and therefore did not infringe
the plaintiffs' rights. The court held that Gap's activities constituted copyright infringement as
they were beyond "the outer limit of the exemption" provided by § 110(5). Id. at 924-25.
141. Id. at 925.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324, 1331 (N.D. III. 1990), aff'd,
949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1992) (in which the court rejected this
interpretation, since "[e]very radio requires wiring-whether external or internal--to reach the
speakers which make the sound"). Id.
145. Id.
146. Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (W.D. Tex.
1988); International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652, 657 (N.D. Ii. 1987), aft'd,
855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988).
147. See Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (D. Mont. 1990);
Merrill, 688 F. Supp. at 1176 (broadcasts were further transmitted because the receiver and
speakers were not located in the same room); International Korwin Corp., 665 F. Supp. at 657
(broadcasts were further transmitted when speakers were located in a separate room from the
receiver); Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 617 F. Supp. 1021, 1022 n.1, 1023 (W.D. Pa.
1985) (holding that "transmit," as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101, was satisfied when a receiver was
located in a private office while the speakers were in the public area).
1996]
732 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
is that there must be a performance.148 A transmission is considered a
"performance" under the copyright laws.'49 Thus, if a proprietor re-
transmits a broadcast to his or her patrons, he or she would be "re-
performing" the broadcast. Without proper authorization, the proprietor re-
performing the radio broadcast is infringing copyright laws.
Another rationale for prohibiting retransmissions stems from
congressional language that denies an exemption "where broadcasts are
transmitted by means of loudspeakers or similar devices in such establish-
ments as... restaurants and quick-service food shops of the type involved
in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken."' 0  Understanding the
congressional language requires an examination of how "transmit," is
defined, and what the phrase "beyond the place where they are sent"
means.151
"Place" as used in the phrase "place where they are sent" appears to
literally refer to the source of the sound. In a traditional stereo, the source
of the sound, or "place," would be the loudspeakers. Under this literal
interpretation, transmissions occur whenever a speaker makes a sound
because soundwaves travel from the speaker to the listener's ear.'52 This
interpretation would render the small business exemption meaningless, as
such a transmission occurs every time a radio is turned on. Congress
specifically granted the exemption to establishments similar to Aiken, and
thus this literal interpretation cannot be correct." 3 Under a broader,
perhaps more logical, reading of the statute, the term "place" is not
confined to the speakers, but to the establishment as a whole."M This
interpretation implies that "a further transmission to the public occurs when
... members of the public outside the confines of the establishment are
able to hear the performance."'' 5 5 The broader reading is not only more
logical, but reconciles congressional intent to exempt small business
establishments from the statutory requirements of § 110(5).156
148. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
149. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 8.18[B], at 8-207.
150. Korman, supra note 46, at 532 (quoting 122 CONG. REC. 1546 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1976)).
151. 17 U.S.C. § 101(5).
152. Wilk, supra note 56, at 807.
153. Id. at 808. This reading of the section would also violate the rule that "[a] statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative
or superfluous, void or insignificant .. " 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES & STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (5th ed. 1992).
154. See Wilk, supra note 56, at 808.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 808 n.121.
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None of the interpretations of the "further transmitted to the public"
factor is satisfactory. A narrow interpretation of the phrase "beyond the
place where they are sent" disqualifies every system, rendering the
exemption meaningless. Alternatively, a broad reading may exempt
virtually all systems, so long as the music cannot be heard outside of the
establishment. 
157
While the policy behind the small business exemption is understan-
dable, the ambiguous statutory language has been riddled with inconsistent
and unexplained interpretations. The four factors for determining whether
an establishment qualifies for the small business exemption have been
discussed repeatedly, but the results have not been totally consistent to
allow for predictability. The result is a body of case law which offers
interpretations not reflective of either legislative intent or statutory
language, and "over a decade of litigation has not produced any consensus
on what the factors mean."' 58  One commentator has even expressed
sympathy to courts which must attempt to make sense of the "statute whose
language and legislative history are at odds with the practical intention to
preserve the Aiken exemption for small businesses which make incidental
use of broadcasted copyrighted works."'59  As Judge Bullock stated in
Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc.," "an objective assessment of the
facts is much more complex than [an] open and shut analysis."'' It is
clear that the small business exemption needs to be re-examined so that the
issues may be resolved.
157. Id. at 811.
158. Wilk, supra note 56, at 841.
159. Gerber, supra note 14, at 15.
160. 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
161. Id. at 1117.
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IV. THE "FAIRNESS IN MUSICAL LICENSING ACT OF 1995 ' 62
A. Rationale Behind the Proposed Changes
A possible solution to the problem of the small business exemption
is the Fairness in Musical Licensing Act of 1995 ("House Bill 789",).I63
House Bill 789 was introduced in response to the current confused state of
the small business exemption as well as to restaurant owners' complaints
about practices which performance rights groups such as ASCAP and BMI
employ in enforcing their rights.1( The two groups have attempted to
negotiate licensing agreements, but without success. 6 Both groups
assert that the other is unreasonable, portraying themselves as the
vulnerable David, and casting the other as the monolithic Goliath.' 66 This
162. Section 2 of H.R. 789 reads:
Section 110(5) of title 17, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
'(5) communication by electronic device of a transmission embodying a
performance or display of a work by the reception of a broadcast, cable, satellite,
or other transmission, unless--
'(A) an admission fee is charged specifically to see or hear the transmission,
or
'(B) the transmission is not properly licensed, except that this paragraph
shall apply in the case of a performance or display in a commercial
establishment only if the performance or display is incidental to the main
purpose of the establishment;
104 H.R. 789 is identical to S. 1137 in the amendment. H.R. 789, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
see S. 1137, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).
163. This concern came to the attention of resolution sponsor Rep. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
(R-Wis.) after representatives from one of the performance rights groups entered a bar and began
to measure the television sets in order to fix the licensing fees. Brooks Boliek, Background
Music to -the Fore, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 6, 1995, at 3, 16.
164. David E. Rovella, Business Seeks Exemption from Paying Royalty Fees, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 6, 1995, at B2.
165. In February 1995, the performance rights groups offered to amend the exemption by
enlarging the square footage of restaurants qualifying for the exemption, and by allowing the use
of four speakers, instead of two. Bill Holland, Rights Societies' Restaurant Fees Proposal
Rejected, BILLBOARD, Oct. 7, 1995, at 20. The National Restaurant Association rejected the offer,
stating in a letter, that "[a]n amendment based on square footage or number of receivers simply
will not meet the reasonable needs of the members of the coalition." Id.
166. J. Kevin Lamb, Counterpunch: Music in Restaurants, Bars Is More Than Incidental,
L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1995, at F5; see also American Songwriters Rally to Stop Unfair Music
Licensing Bills, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 26, 1995 (Entertainment, Television, & Culture Section),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
The National Restaurant Association argues that the current exemption allows the groups
to collect from both the broadcasters of the music and the businesses which pick up and
broadcast. Rovella, supra note 164, at B2. The performance rights groups get to "double dip,"
by collecting royalties from the radio station airing the work, and from the restaurant that tunes
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is also not the first time that music users have attempted to voice their
complaints through legislation. Many bills attempting to change or reverse
the Supreme Court's Jewell-LaSalle holding have not been enacted.
67
A bill similar to House Bill 789 was introduced in 1994, but Congress
adjourned before discussing the bill.
68
The proposed amendment to § 110(5) substantially broadens the
current exemption. First, the bill eliminates two areas of ambiguity. By
changing the language from "communication of a transmission ... on a
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes
169
to "communication by electronic device of a transmission ...by the
reception of a broadcast, cable, satellite, or other transmission," "o courts
will no longer have to struggle with categorizing sound systems as
"commercial" or "commonly used in private homes."'' The new
exemption would apply to all transmissions regardless of the stereo's size,
complexity, or common usage.
Second, the bill also eliminates language'72 which denies an exemp-
tion if the broadcasted works are "received [and] further transmitted to the
public."' 73  The current provision follows the older, pre-Aiken standard
which would render activities, such as those in Jewell-LaSalle, acts of
infringement.'74 By comparison, the new subsection would only prohibit
exemption if the "transmission is not properly licensed,"' 75 meaning that
restaurant owners will have to pay licensing fees only if the original
into the station. Frank Green, Out of Tune with ASCAP, BMI Fees Have Restaurant, Bar Owners
Singing the Blues, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 3, 1995, at Cl.
Nonetheless, music users agree that authors should receive payment for their creations.
See also Valerie Kuklenski, It's Not Just 10 Cents a Dance, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug. 3, 1995,
at Arts & Entertainment, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. Because of this
concern, the bill only applies to 'incidental' radio music played over elaborate, multi-speaker
systems. Music which is live, or comes from jukeboxes, records, tapes, or videos would still
require licenses. Bill Holland, Rights Groups to Renew Bar Bill Fight, BILLBOARD, Sept. 2, 1995,
at 5.
167. Korman, supra note 46, at 531.
168. Ron Ruggles, Operators to Lawmakers: Now You're Playing Our Song, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Feb. 27, 1995, at 1.
169. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994).
170. H.R. 789, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1995).
171. Elimination of this language from the current exemption will render this analysis
unnecessary.
172. H.R. 789, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
173. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B).
174. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5656, 5701.
175. H.R. 789, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1995).
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broadcast of the work were not licensed by the initial broadcaster.76
This language would only be applicable to a situation like that in Jewell-
LaSalle, where the transmission of the music received and then rebroadcast
by the proprietor was not properly licensed by the initial broadcaster, the
radio station.
177
In other words, the proposed amendment only denies exemption to
music users who tune into a station that has not attained the proper license
to air the copyrighted work. As a practical matter, owners today who tune
into a radio station should not have to worry about infringing copyrights
since the radio station presumably have already obtained the proper
licensing agreements with royalty groups.
While these two changes already broaden the scope of the exemption,
the most significant modification is the additional clause which would
exempt nearly all public establishments whose "main purpose" is "inci-
dental"'7 8 to the musical performance. 79  The clause directly addresses
establishments which use radio broadcasts as "background music." The
amendment, if passed, would exempt restaurant and bar owners from
obtaining a license for using radio music, since the musical broadcast
would be "incidental" or "aside" to the main purpose of their business
which is to serve food. 180
B. Overall Effect of the Proposed Bill
House Bill 789 exempts music purveyors who use radio broadcasts as
their musical source from having to purchase licenses.' 8' The federal bill
extends the § 110(5) exemption,'2 the "most litigated exemption of the
Copyright Act"'83 so that background or incidental radio music played in
176. Id.
177. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5656, 5701.
178. H.R. 789, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1995).
179. Boliek, supra note 163, at 3, 16.
180. The "incidental" concept may take the place of the "direct charge" language, since the
entire concept of incidental or background music is that it is aside from the main purpose of a
restaurant. By imposing a direct charge to hear the music, it no longer remains in the background
and thus, is not incidental to an establishment's goal of providing food and service. Proprietors,
then, should not reap the benefits of the exemption if they financially gain from the music.
181. H.R. 789, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
182. Id.
183. 140 CONG. REC. E1700-03, (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1994) (testimony of Rep. Jack Reed (D-
R.I.)).
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stores, regardless of the size of the receiving apparatus or establishment,
would not require a license."'
Although elimination of certain language in the section would make
application and interpretation of the statute simpler, opponents of the
proposal contend that doing so would have grave implications.'85
Performance rights groups contend that passage of these bills would not
only decrease the royalties received by copyright holders, but would
effectively "destroy general licensing, as restaurant owners would serve
only no-fee music to customers."'6 Some copyright experts predict that
passage of the bill will also have international implications.'87 The
amendment marks further erosion of copyright protection and may send the
message to foreign countries that public broadcasting of copyrighted
materials may not be subjected to copyright laws.18 8  The legislation
would "undermine the United States' credibility when it demands strict
enforcement of copyrights on American music and other intellectual
properties in foreign markets."' 89
Performance rights groups state that licensing fees paid by businesses
to broadcast music in their establishments comprise approximately twenty
to twenty-five percent of songwriters' revenues.' 9' Although the exemp-
tion eliminates a portion of a copyright holder's income, the loss may not
be as substantial as it seems at first glance. The exemption addresses and
only applies to radio music played over multi-speaker systems.' 9 '
Owners who do not wish to hear commercials or talk from radio per-
sonalities will not want to use radio broadcasts in their establishments. 92
They may opt to provide music through sources such as juke boxes, or by
184. Id. See generally Ruggles, supra note 168, at 1; NRF Urges House to Support Fairness
in Musical Licensing Act of 1995, PR NEWSWiRE, Feb. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File.
185. Rovella, supra note 164, at B2.
186. Bill Holland, Rights Societies' Restaurant Fees Proposal Rejected, BILLBOARD, Oct.
7, 1995, at 20. Not all performance rights groups oppose the legislation. Alicia C. Evelyn, of
Alicia Carolyn Evelyn Music Publishing Co., believes that "[s]ongwriters of limited success may
benefit from... possible exposure of their music to the dining public." Letters, BILLBOARD,
Aug. 26, 1995, at 6.
187. Rovella, supra note 164, at B2.
188. Id.
189. Kuklenski, supra note 166.
190. Rovella, supra note 164, at B2.
191. H.R. 789, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
192. Of course, the opposite is also true. See BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482
(7th Cir. 1991) (retail chain store had a trial subscription to a commercial background music
service but canceled the subscription because employees preferred radio music).
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subscribing to a commercial music service such as Muzak. 9 3  Thus,
while it is possible that this amendment will diminish the publishing
royalties which copyright holders receive, and may even encourage some
establishments to switch over to radio music, it will not completely
eliminate revenue. Even if all restaurants switch to radio music, royalties
will not evaporate, since radio stations still are subject to copyright laws
and must obtain licenses in order to broadcast the songs.
V. CONCLUSION
Background music has been analogized to the decorative piece of
parsley on plates: "It looks good, but it's insignificant. But because it's
insignificant, should parsley growers be required to give their product
away?"' 94  Performance rights groups, which represent and collect
royalties for songwriters, contend that restaurants and bars which wish to
provide music over multi-speaker systems to their patrons should pay for
it. 95  While the reasons behind the sentiment are clear--that copyright
holders should receive royalties for performances of their works-inter-
pretation of the law in this area has been less than clear.
The policy of the Copyright Act is to balance the interests of the
public against those of the copyright holder." "The primary policy of
the Copyright Act is to give the public maximum access to the author's
work; a secondary purpose is to remunerate the copyright owner."'"
Radio broadcasts of a song give the writer and composer maximum
exposure to the public as well as royalties to the copyright holder. This
amendment would also remedy the situation in which a licensing group
obtains more than one license for the same performance of a work. For
193. Music from juke boxes, compact discs, and tapes will still require proper licenses.
Holland, supra note 166, at 5. For explanation of Muzak and its services, see Birthday Presence,
supra note 53; Sound Affects, supra note 2.
194. Rovella, supra note 164, at B I (quoting Marvin L. Berenson, general counsel of BMI);
see also American Songwriters Rally to Stop Unfair Music Licensing Bills, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr.
26, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (analogy of music to parsley); Foster,
supra note 8, § 1.
The analogy is not perfect, however, as parsley growers directly lose even if restaurants
give parsley away. The same is not true with music. Songwriters do not suffer a direct loss
when their music is played. Arguably, allowing restaurants to play music without a fee serves
as an advertisement and may encourage the patrons to purchase the copyrighted works.
195. As a policy, ASCAP does not require a license for radio music which is played over
a receiver with only one speaker. Korman, supra note 46, at 528 n.32.
196. See Philip C. Bobbit, Cable Television and Copyright Royalties, 83 YALE L.J. 554, 557-
58 (1974).
197. Id.
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example, if a marching band plays an ASCAP tune during a half-time
show, the band, the stadium, the television network broadcasting the game,
the teams, and any restaurant which shows the game in its premises all
need to pay licensing fees. 9 ' Requiring restaurateurs to purchase what
is otherwise free to the public may discourage use of music as a whole.
This in turn would limit the public's exposure to works, thereby under-
mining the intent of the Copyright Act.
It also seems counter-intuitive to categorize the mere act of turning on
a radio as a "further transmission," and to require restaurants to pay for the
music which is played by a particular radio station, but not require licenses
for listening to the same broadcast in private homes.' 99 By specifically
addressing radio music and eliminating ambiguous language concerning the
type of receiving apparatus, House Bill 789 makes the exemption easier to
understand. The proposed exemption allows restaurant and small business
owners and their attorneys to assess their circumstances, and to determine
if the establishment is exempt from having to obtain a license, or if the
owner should negotiate a license with the performance rights groups.2 °"
The amendment also avoids ambiguities concerning which electronic
equipment and configurations are "commonly used in private homes," thus
avoiding the dangers of changing any set standards as technology advances.
Although the amendment may grant the exemption to more busines-
ses, thereby reducing performance royalties received by copyright holders,
the "Fairness in Musical Licensing Act of 1995" is a closer step toward
solving the inconsistencies created by the small business exemption. The
amendment will allow increased exposure of copyrighted works to the
public, and at the same time ensure that contemporary versions of Aiken's
chicken restaurant will receive the copyright exemption Congress intended.
198. Kuklenski, supra note 166.
199. See Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929). The court observed that:
One who ... merely actuates electrical instrumentalities .... does not 'perform'
within the meaning of the Copyright Law. The performance in such case takes
place in the studio of the broadcasting station, and the operator of the receiving set
... does nothing more than one would do who opened a window and permitted the
strains of music of a passing band to come within the inclosure in which he was
located.
Id. at 735.
200. 141 CONG. REc. S12079-03, 812085 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1995) (testimony of Sen. Craig
Thomas (R-Wyo.) in support of legislation).
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